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Abstract
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there
are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to
defend critical targets and the attacker seeks his most favorable target to attack. In the past decade,
there has been a surge of research interest in analyzing and solving security games that are motivated by
applications from various domains. Remarkably, these models and their game-theoretic solutions have
led to real-world deployments in use by major security agencies like the LAX airport, the US Coast
Guard and Federal Air Marshal Service, as well as non-governmental organizations. Among all these
research and applications, equilibrium computation serves as a foundation.
This paper examines security games from a theoretical perspective and provides a unified view of
various security game models. In particular, each security game can be characterized by a set system E
which consists of the defender’s pure strategies; The defender’s best response problem can be viewed
as a combinatorial optimization problem over E . Our framework captures most of the basic security
game models in the literature, including all the deployed systems; The set system E arising from various
domains encodes standard combinatorial problems like bipartite matching, maximum coverage, min-cost
flow, packing problems, etc. Our main result shows that equilibrium computation in security games is
essentially a combinatorial problem. In particular, we prove that, for any set system E , the following
problems can be reduced to each other in polynomial time: (0) combinatorial optimization over E ;
(1) computing the minimax equilibrium for zero-sum security games over E ; (2) computing the strong
Stackelberg equilibrium for security games over E ; (3) computing the best or worst (for the defender)
Nash equilibrium for security games over E . Therefore, the hardness [polynomial solvability] of any of
these problems implies the hardness [polynomial solvability] of all the others. Here, by “games over E”
we mean the class of security games with arbitrary payoff structures, but a fixed set E of defender pure
strategies. This shows that the complexity of a security game is essentially determined by the set system
E . We view drawing these connections as an important conceptual contribution of this paper.
1 Introduction
The security of critical infrastructures and areas is an important concern around the world, especially given
the increasing threats of terrorism. Limited security resources cannot provide full security coverage at all
places all the time, leaving potential attackers the chance to explore patrolling patterns and attack the weak-
ness. How can we make use of the limited resources to build the most effective defense against strategic
∗Supported by NSF grant CCF- 1350900 and MURI grant W911NF-11-1-0332.
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attackers? The past decade has seen an explosion of research in attempt to address this fundamental ques-
tion, which has led to the development of the well-known model of security games. A security game is a
two-player game played between a defender and an attacker. The defender allocates (possibly randomly)
limited security resources, subject to various domain constraints, to protect a set of targets; The attacker
chooses one target to attack. This is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments, and
naturally captures the strategic interaction between security agencies and potential adversaries. Indeed, these
models and their game-theoretic solutions have led to real-world deployments in use today by major security
agencies. For example, they are used by LAX airport for checkpoint placement, the US Coast Guard for port
patrolling and the Federal Air Marshal Service for scheduling air marshals [30]; Recently, new models and
algorithms have been tested by the Transportation Security Administration for airport passenger screening
[4] and by non-governmental organizations in Malaysia for wildlife protection [11].
Equilibrium computation is perhaps the most basic problem in security games. Indeed, there have been
numerous algorithms developed for solving various security games motivated by different real-world appli-
cations (we refer the reader to [30] for a review). However, many of these algorithms are based on integer
linear programs and heuristics, which may run in exponential time or output non-optimal solutions. The
computational complexity of solving these games is not well-understood. Moreover, most of the literature
has focused on the computation of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (minimax equilibrium when the game
is zero-sum), which may be inappropriate when the players move simultaneously (see Section 3.2 for a
more detailed discussion). In this paper, we systematically study the computational complexity of the three
main equilibrium concepts adopted in security games, namely, the minimax equilibrium, strong Stackel-
berg equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. However, instead of examining all the models one by one, we
provide a unified view of security games that captures most of the basic models in the literature, and prove
our results in this general framework. Interestingly, it turns out that none of these equilibrium concepts is
computationally harder than the others in any security game captured by our framework.
1.1 Our Results
We start with a unified formulation of security games. In particular, we show that security games are es-
sentially bilinear games, in which each player’s payoff has the form xTAy + α · y; the defender’s mixed
strategy x lies in a polytopeP ⊆ Rn and the attacker’s mixed strategy y is in the n-dimensional simplex ∆n.
Interestingly, the vertices of P , i.e., all the defender pure strategies, form a set system E , and the defender’s
best response problem can be viewed as a combinatorial optimization problem over E . This general frame-
work captures most of the basic security game models in the literature, including all the deployed security
systems. We show that, the set system E arising from various security domains encodes many standard
combinatorial problems like bipartite matching, maximum coverage, min-cost flow, packing problems, etc.
We are interested in solving the class of security games over E , by which we mean all security games
with arbitrary payoff structures, but a fixed set E of defender pure strategies. Our main theoretical results
build connections between combinatorial optimization over E and equilibrium computation for security
games over E . In particular, we prove that, for any set system E , the following problems can be reduced
to each other in polynomial time: (0) combinatorial optimization over E ; (1) computing the minimax equi-
librium for zero-sum security games over E ; (2) computing the strong Stackelberg equilibrium for security
games over E ; (3) computing the best or worst (for the defender) Nash equilibrium for security games over E .
Therefore, the hardness [polynomial solvability] of any of these problems implies the hardness [polynomial
solvability] of all the others. This shows that the complexity of a security game is essentially determined
by the set system E . As applications of these results, we also show how to use them to easily recover and
strengthen some known complexity results in the literature, as well as to resolve some open problems from
previous work. We remark that though these results are primarily theoretical, our reductions from equilib-
rium computation to combinatorial optimization can be practically implemented via well-known engineering
2
approaches, e.g., the column generation technique.
1.2 Related Work
Several papers have examined the computational complexity of security games in particular settings. The
most relevant are the following two papers: Korzhyk et al. [18] consider the security settings where each
security resource can be allocated to protect a subset of targets; Letchford and Conitzer [22] consider security
games on graphs where targets are nodes and security resources patrol along paths. They show polynomial
solvability or NP-hardness under different conditions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other work
which specifically focuses on a complexity study of security games. Nevertheless, some hardness results
are provided separately in different work for different models, e.g., [4, 13]. We note that our framework
only concerns the basic security game models. There are various refinements of the basic models, e.g., the
Bayesian setting, repeated setting, stochastic setting, etc. Examining the complexity of these settings is an
interesting avenue for future work, but is not the focus of this paper.
Also related to our work is the rich literature on equilibrium computation for succinctly represented
games. The most fundamental problem along this line is to compute one Nash equilibrium for a two-
player normal-form game. This is proven to be PPAD-hard [6, 9]. In the same setting, computing the Nash
equilibrium that maximizes one player’s utility is NP-hard [8, 15], but the strong Stackelberg equilibrium
can be computed in polynomial time by solving linear programs [7]. Immorlica et al. [17] consider the
computation of bilinear zero-sum games, and show how to compute the minimax equilibrium when both
players’ action polytopes have explicit polynomial-size representations. They also reduce computing an
-minimax equilibrium to an additive FPTAS for the player’s best response problem, using the no regret
learning framework. However, they do not consider the reverse direction, namely, the reduction from best
response to equilibrium computation. Garg et al. [14] consider bilinear general-sum games, and show that
such games encode many interesting classes of games, including two-player normal-form games, two-player
Bayesian games, polymatrix games, etc., hence are hard to solve in general. They propose polynomial time
algorithms for computing approximate equilibria when the payoff matrices have low rank.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Game Theory Basics
A bilinear game is given by a pair of matrices (A,B) and polytopes (P,Q). Given that player 1 plays
x ∈ P and player 2 plays y ∈ Q, the utilities for player 1 and 2 are xTAy and xTBy respectively. As
we will show later, security games are essentially bilinear games with slightly richer structure of the form
xTAy + α · y and xTBy + β · y. Note that each vertex of the polytope is a pure strategy, and a player
may have exponentially many pure strategies even though her action polytope (e.g., a hypercube) can be
compactly represented. Throughout this paper, we assume all the action polytopes are compact.
Nash Equilibrium (NE). A strategy profile (x,y) is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE), if
xTAy ≥ x′TAy, ∀x′ ∈ P and xTBy ≥ xTBy′, ∀y′ ∈ Q.
According to Nash’s theorem, there exists at least one NE, possibly multiple NEs, in a bilinear game. As
observed in [14], bilinear games are general enough to capture many interesting classes of games, therefore
computing an NE is hard in general bilinear games.
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE). NE captures the equilibrium outcome of a simultaneous-move
game. However, when one player moves before another player, the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium [33, 34]
serves as a more appropriate solution concept. A two-player Stackelberg game is played between a leader
and a follower. The leader moves first, or equivalently, commits to a mixed strategy; The follower observes
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the leader’s strategy and best responds. The leader’s optimal strategy, together with the follower’s best
response, forms an SSE. Formally, let yx = arg maxy′∈Q xTBy′ denote the follower’s best response to a
leader strategy x ∈ P . A strategy profile (x,y) is called a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE), if
x = arg max
x′∈P
x′TAyx′ , and y = yx.
Without loss of generality, we can assume y is a pure strategy since it is a best response to x.
Zero-Sum Games and the Minimax Equilibrium. When A = −B, the bilinear game is zero-sum. As
widely known, all standard equilibrium concepts, including the NE and SSE, are payoff-equivalent to the
minimax equilibrium in zero-sum games. A strategy profile (x,y), where x ∈ P and y ∈ Q, is called a
minimax equilibrium if
xTAy ≥ x′TAy, ∀x′ ∈ P and xTAy ≤ xTAy′, ∀y′ ∈ Q.
If (x,y) is a minimax equilibrium, x is called the player 1’s maximin strategy, y is called the player 2’s
minimax strategy and V = xTAy = maxx′∈P miny′∈Q x′TAy′ is called the value of the game. Each
zero-sum game has a unique game value.
2.2 Linear Optimization and Convex Decomposition via Oracles
Any linear optimization problem can be implicitly described as maxx∈P cTx where P ⊆ RN is a polytope.
By “(linear) optimization over P” we mean solving the problem maxx∈P cTx for any c ∈ RN . A member-
ship oracle for P is an algorithm that, on input x0 ∈ RN , correctly asserts whether x0 is in P or not. A
separation oracle for P is an algorithm that, on input x0 ∈ RN , either asserts x0 ∈ P or finds a hyperplane
aTx = b that separates x0 from P in the following sense: aTx0 > b and aTx ≤ b for any x ∈ P . The
membership [separation] problem for polytope P is to compute a membership [separation] oracle for P . In
the following theorems, by “polynomial running time” we mean polynomial in the dimension N and the
description length of the instance; Solving an LP means returning the optimal objective value as well as a
vertex optimal solution. The following celebrated results are due to Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [16].
Theorem 2.1. Let P ⊆ RN be a polytope. If there is a polynomial time algorithm to solve the separation
problem for P , then there is a polynomial time algorithm to solve any linear program over P as well as its
dual program.
Theorem 2.2. (Also see [29, P.189]) Let P ⊆ RN be a polytope, and assume x0 ∈ P be a point known to
any algorithm. Then there is a polynomial time algorithm for the optimization problem over P if and only if
there is a polynomial time algorithm for the membership problem for P .
To implement a mixed strategy x ∈ P , we need to decompose x into a linear combination of pure
strategies, i.e., vertices of P . This can also be done efficiently given access to an efficient separation oracle.
Theorem 2.3. Let P ⊆ RN be a polytope. If the separation problem for P can be solved in polynomial time,
then there is a polynomial time algorithm that, on any input x ∈ P , computesN +1 vertices x1, ..., xN+1 ∈
P and convex coefficients λ1, ..., λN+1 such that x =
∑N+1
i=1 λixi.
3 The Model of Security Games
3.1 Strategies and Payoff Structures
A security game is a two-player game played between a defender and an attacker. The defender possesses
multiple security resources and aims to allocate these resources to protect n targets (e.g., physical facilities,
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critical locations, etc.) from the attacker’s attack. We use [n] to denote the set of these targets. A defender
pure strategy is a subset of targets that is protected (a.k.a., covered) in a feasible allocation of these resources.
For example, the defender may have k(< n) security resources, each of which can be assigned to protect
any target. In this simple example, any subset of [n] with size at most k is a defender pure strategy. However,
in practice, there are usually resource allocation constraints, thus not all such subsets correspond to feasible
allocations. We will provide more examples in Section 3.3.
A more convenient representation of a pure strategy, as will be used throughout the paper, is a binary
vector e ∈ {0, 1}n, in which the entries of value 1 specify the covered targets. Let E ⊆ {0, 1}n denote the
set of all defender pure strategies. Notice that E also represents a set system. The size of E is very large,
usually exponential in the number of security resources. In the example mentioned above, |E| = Ω(nk)
which is exponential in k. Therefore, computational efficiency in security games means time polynomial in
n, not |E|. A defender mixed strategy is a distribution p over the elements in E . The attacker chooses one
target to attack, thus an attacker pure strategy is a target i ∈ [n]. We use y ∈ ∆n to denote an attacker
mixed strategy where yi is the probability of attacking target i.
The payoff structure of the game is as follows: given that the attacker attacks target i, the defender gets
a reward ri if target i is covered or a cost ci if i is uncovered; while the attacker gets a cost ζi if target i is
covered or a reward ρi if i is uncovered. Both players have utility 0 on the other n− 1 unattacked targets. A
crucial structure of security games is summarized in the following assumption: ri > ci and ρi > ζi for all
i ∈ [n]. That is, covering a target is strictly beneficial to the defender than uncovering it; and the attacker
prefers to attack a target when it is uncovered.1 We formalize the model of security games in the following
definition.
Definition 3.1. [Security Game] A security game G with n targets is given by the following tuple (r, c, ρ, ζ, E)
and satisfies ri > ci and ρi > ζi for all i ∈ [n]. The security game is zero-sum if ri+ ζi = 0 and ci+ρi = 0
for all i ∈ [n].
We denote a security game by G(r, c, ρ, ζ, E). When the game is zero-sum, we also use G(r, c, E) for
short. We are interested in solving security games over E , by which we mean security games with arbitrary
payoff structures, but a fixed set E of defender pure strategies. The defender’s utility, as a function of the
defender pure strategy e and attacker pure strategy i, can be formally expressed as
Ud(e, i) = ri · ei + ci · (1− ei),
where ei is the i’th entry of e. Given a defender mixed strategy p ∈ ∆|E| and attacker mixed strategy
y ∈ ∆n, we use Ud(p,y) to denote the defender’s expected utility, which can be expressed as
Ud(p,y) =
∑
e∈E
∑n
i=1 peyiU
d(e, i)
=
∑
e∈E
∑n
i=1 peyi
(
ri · ei + ci · (1− ei)
)
=
∑n
i=1 yi
(
ri ·
∑
e∈E peei + ci · (1−
∑
e∈E peei)
)
=
∑n
i=1 yi
(
ri · xi + ci · [1− xi]
) (1)
where
xi =
∑
e∈E
peei ∈ [0, 1] (2)
1In practice, the attacker can also choose to not attack. This can be incorporated into the current model by adding a dummy
target. Therefore, we will not explicitly consider the case here.
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is the marginal coverage probability of target i. Let x = (x1, ..., xn)T denote the marginal probability for
all targets induced by the mixed strategy p. Notice that the marginal probability induced by a pure strategy
e is precisely e itself.2 Equation (1) shows that the defender’s expected utility can be compactly expressed
as the bilinear form xTAy + α · y for some non-negative diagonal matrix A, where x is the marginal
probability induced by the defender mixed strategy. We note that the convex hull of E forms a polytope
P = {x : x = ∑e∈E pe ·e, ∀p ∈ ∆|E|} which consists of all the feasible (i.e., implementable by a defender
mixed strategy) marginal probabilities.3
For the rest of this paper, we will simply interpret a point x ∈ P as a mixed strategy, and instead write
the defender’s utility as Ud(x,y). Similarly, the attacker’s expected utility can be compactly represented in
the following form. We note that Ua(x,y) also has the bilinear form xTBy + β · y for some non-positive
diagonal matrix B.
Ua(x,y) =
n∑
i=1
yi
(
ρi · [1− xi] + ζi · xi
)
. (3)
3.2 Equilibrium Concepts
Many security games, including some deployed systems [1, 37], are modeled as zero-sum games. That is,
the defender’s reward [cost] is the negative of the attacker’s cost [reward]. For example, in the deployed
security system for patrolling proof-of-payment metro-systems [37], the defender aims to catch fare evaders
at metro stations. This game is naturally zero-sum: the evader’s cost of paying a fine is the defender’s reward
of catching the evader, while the ticket price is the evader’s reward and the defender’s cost if failing to catch
the evader. In zero-sum games, all standard equilibrium concepts are payoff-equivalent to the minimax
equilibrium, and our goal is to compute the minimax equilibrium in poly(n) time.
When the game is not zero-sum, the main solution concept adopted in the literature of security games
is the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) [33, 34]. In particular, the defender plays the role of the leader
and can commit to a mixed strategy before the attacker moves. The attacker observes the defender’s mixed
strategy and best responds. This is motivated by the consideration that the attacker usually does surveillance
before committing an attack, thus is able to observe the empirical distribution of the defender’s patrolling
strategy [30]. In this case, our goal is to compute the optimal mixed strategy for the defender to commit to
(the attacker’s best response problem is usually trivial). Notice that, the attacker is not able to observe the
defender’s real-time deployment (i.e., the sampled pure strategy) since he has to plan the attack before the
defender’s real-time pure strategy is sampled.
The strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is appropriate only when the attacker does surveillance and
can indeed observe the defender’s past actions. However, in many cases the attacker does little surveillance.
In fact, even if the attacker intends to do surveillance, sometimes he cannot observe the defender’s strategies
due to limited resources and confidentiality of the defender’s resource allocation (e.g., plainclothes police).
In these settings, the defender cannot commit to a strategy, thus Nash equilibrium (NE) serves as a more
appropriate solution concept. Simultaneous-move security game models are particularly common for mod-
eling interactions with terrorism, partially due to the fact that the defender’s actions are confidential in such
settings (see, e.g., [3, 23, 27, 28]). In networked information systems, the interaction between the defender
(system protector) and attacker (malware) is usually modeled as a simultaneous-move security game as
2Here we assume security forces have perfect protection effectiveness. That is, once a target is covered, regardless by one or
multiple resources, it is fully protected with probability 1. Generalization to nonperfect effectiveness is straightforward.
3One type of security games that is not captured by this model is the network interdiction game [31, 35], in which the defender
chooses edges to defend and the attacker chooses a path to attack. The task of the defender is to interdict the attacker at a certain
edge. The utility functions in this game do not have the bilinear structure, and are non-convex in general. This belongs to the more
general class of succinctly represented games with non-linear payoffs, which is EXP-hard to solve even in zero-sum cases [12].
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well since malwares typically do not analyze past system behaviors. The goal is usually to compute some
particular (e.g., best or worst) Nash equilibrium [24, 25].
3.3 Security Games & Combinatorial Optimization
The main theme of this paper is to build connections between combinatorial optimization and equilibrium
computation in security games. In particular, we consider the following combinatorial problem.
Problem 3.2 (Defender Best Response (DBR)). For any non-negative weight vector w ∈ Rn+, compute
e∗ = arg max
e∈E
[w · e].
The DBR problem over E is to compute arg maxe∈E [w · e] for any input w ∈ Rn+.
In other words, the DBR problem is to compute a defender pure strategy that maximizes the total weight
it “collects”. We claim that Problem 3.2 is precisely the defender’s best response problem to an arbi-
trary attacker mixed strategy. To see this, given any attacker mixed strategy y, we have Ud(x,y) =∑n
i=1 xi
(
yi[ri − ci]
)
+
∑n
i=1 yici for any x ∈ P . Let wi = yi[ri − ci] ≥ 0, then the defender’s best
response to y is arg maxx∈P x ·w = arg maxe∈E e ·w. Conversely, given any w ∈ Rn+, it is easy to find an
attacker mixed strategy y ∈ ∆n such that yi(ri − ci) is proportional to wi for all i ∈ [n], making Problem
3.2 equivalent to the defender’s best response to y. Notice that the DBR problem is a combinatorial opti-
mization problem over the set system E . The difference among various security game models essentially lies
in the structure of E . Next, we illustrate how some typical DBR problems relate to standard combinatorial
problems.
Uniform Matroid. In simple security settings, the defender has a certain number of security resources,
say k resources; each resource can be assigned to protect any (one) target – i.e., no allocation constraints.
Therefore, any subset of [n] of size at most k is a defender pure strategy. In this case, E is a uniform matroid
and the DBR problem is simply to find the largest k weights. The deployed security system for LAX airport
checkpoint placement – one of the earliest applications of security games – is captured by this model [26].
Bipartite Matching. A natural generalization of the uniform matroid case is that the resource allocation
is constrained. In this case, the defender has k heterogeneous resources, and each resource can only be
assigned to some particular targets associated with that resource. This naturally models several types of
scheduling constraints in practice. For example, due to geographic constraints, policemen from a certain
police station can only patrol the area around that station. Also, different types of security forces specialize
in protecting different types of targets. Here, feasible assignments can be modeled as edges of a bipartite
graph with security resources on one side and targets on another side. A defender pure strategy corresponds
to a bipartite matching, and the DBR problem is to compute the maximum weighted bipartite matching.
Coverage Problems. In some domains, one security resource can cover several targets. One deployed
real-world example is the federal air marshal scheduling problem, where one air marshal is assigned to
protect several flights, but constrained on that the arrival destination of any former flight should be the
starting point of the next flight [32]. In other words, each security resource (i.e., air marshal) can protect a
subset of targets (i.e., flights). Therefore, each pure strategy is the union of targets covered by each security
resource. The DBR problem in this case is the maximum weighted coverage problem. Another natural
example is to protect targets distributed on the plane and each security guard can cover a region of certain
size. The DBR problem here is a 2-dimensional geometric maximum coverage problem.4 Other examples
include patrolling on a graph (e.g., street map or network systems) in which a patroller at a node can protect
all adjacent edges or a patroller on an edge can protect its two end nodes. The DBR problem here is the
vertex or edge coverage problem.
4For more information about geometric coverage, see the thesis [21] and references therein.
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Figure 1: Feasible (blue) and infeasible (red) moves in spatio-temporal spaces.
Min-Cost Flow. Many security games are played out in spatio-temporal spaces. For example, the
deployed security system in [10] helps to schedule the patrol boats of the US Coast Guard to protect the
(moving) Staten Island ferries every day. Wildlife protection is another example [11]. One common way
to handle such settings is to discretize the space and build a 2-D – spatial and temporal dimension – grid,
and patrol the discrete (space, time) points (see Figure 1). However, starting from a position at time t, the
positions that a security resource can possibly reach at time t + 1 are restricted due to various constraints
like speed limit, terrain barriers, etc. For example, the move highlighted by red in Figure 1 may be infeasible
since a patroller can not move that far within a small time period due to speed limit, while the blue-colored
moves are feasible. This can be modeled by adding edges between time layers to indicate feasible moves.
The patrolling schedule for each security resource corresponds to a path across all time layers, which spec-
ifies the position this resource covers at each time point (see the blue path in Figure 1). The DBR problem
is, for any given non-negative weights at each (space, time) point, computing k paths for the k resources to
maximize the total weights they cover. This can be converted to a min-cost max flow problem (with negative
costs).
Packing Problems. Our last example is motivated by recent work on optimizing the allocation of secu-
rity resources for passenger screening for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) [4]. Consider
an airport with n flights and flight i has mi passengers. The TSA has several screening tools, e.g., x-ray,
walk-through metal detector, chemicals, etc., and each screening tool has a capacity of the maximum num-
ber of passengers it can check. In contrast to the case of coverage problems where each resource can protect
several targets, here several tools are required to screen one passenger. More precisely, each passenger is
screened by a screening team which is a combination of several screening tools. By protecting the flight
from a certain passenger we mean a passenger of that flight is screened, and identified as an attacker if he
is, by a screening team.5 The DBR problem is to, given non-negative weight wi for passengers in flight
i, allocate as many passengers as possible to teams for screening, subject to each screening tool’s capacity
constraint, so that the total weight of screened passengers are maximized. This is a very general packing
problem. In fact, the reader may easily verify that even when wi = 1 and mi = 1 for any flight i, the
problem encodes the independent set problem.
Remark 3.3. We note that the list of examples above is by no means complete – there are various other
security settings with other combinatorial structures. For example, there is also study on budget constraints
for acquiring security resources (e.g., [2]), which induces the budgeted version of the above combinatorial
problems. In fact, real domains are usually more complicated with various types of constraints, involving
intersections of these combinatorial structures.
5In [4], each screening team has an effectiveness factor denoting the probability a team can identify an attacker. The setting here
is slightly simplified with perfect effectiveness factor 1. Nevertheless, it still captures the core difficulty of the problem.
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max u
s.t. xiri + (1− xi)ci ≥ u, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.∑
e∈E pe · e = x∑
e∈E pe = 1
pe ≥ 0, for e ∈ E .
Figure 2: The defender’s maximin strategy
(variables: xi, pe and u)
min
∑n
i=1 ciyi + r
s.t. r − e ·w ≥ 0, for e ∈ E .
(ri − ci)yi = wi, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.∑n
i=1 yi = 1
yi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Figure 3: The attacker’s minimax strategy
(variables: yi, wi and r)
4 Solving Zero-Sum Security Games is a Combinatorial Problem
In this section, we focus on zero-sum security games. Recall that we use n to denote the total number of
targets, and reward ri [cost ci] to denote the defender’s utility of covering [uncovering] target i when it is
attacked. The defender seeks to maximize her utility while the attacker seeks to minimize the defender’s
utility. We are interested in computing the minimax equilibrium for security games over E in poly(n) time.
More specifically, we seek to understand how the computational complexity of the minimax equilibrium
relates to the complexity of the DBR problem. By convention, we sometimes call an algorithm for solving
the DBR problem a DBR oracle. We prove the following equivalence theorem.
Theorem 4.1. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the minimax equilibrium for zero-sum security
games over E , if and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to solve the DBR problem over E .
Since security games are essentially bilinear games, it is not surprising that the minimax equilibrium
can be reduced an the DBR problem, and the reduction follows a standard primal-dual argument. What
is interesting, however, is the reverse direction – i.e., solving the DBR problem is no harder than solving
zero-sum security games. The minimax equilibrium, as an optimization problem, has a special objective
function. It is not clear that such a special objective can be as hard as optimizing an arbitrary non-negative
objective over E . Moreover, security games are very special bilinear games: (i) the attacker’s mixed strategy
set is a simplex; (ii) the defender’s payoff matrix is non-negative and diagonal; (iii) the attacker’s payoff
matrix is non-positive and diagonal. Thus unsurprisingly, there have been attempts in the literature on
solving security games without going through the DBR problem. Indeed, various other techniques have
been employed to tackle security games, e.g., generalized Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [5], techniques
from convex and non-convex optimization, etc. However, the message conveyed in Theorem 4.1 is that,
to solve security games in polynomial time, it is not only sufficient, but also necessary, to solve the DBR
problem in polynomial time. We now provide a formal proof of Theorem 4.1.
Reducing Minimax Equilibrium to DBR
Figure 2 and 3 exhibit the linear programs for computing the defender’s maximin strategy and the attacker’s
minimax strategy. They are primal and dual of each other. We observe that the linear program in Figure (3)
admits a poly(n) time separation oracle, if the DBR problem can be solved in poly(n) time. In particular,
given any r and wi, yi for i ∈ [n], we can explicitly check the last three constraints in poly(n) time. To
check whether they satisfy the first constraint, we run the DBR oracle which outputs a pure strategy e∗. If
r < e∗ · w, then the first constraint is violated at e = e∗. Otherwise, r ≥ e∗ · w = maxe∈E ≥ e · w for
any e ∈ E . Therefore, the first constraint is satisfied. To sum up, the linear program in Figure (3) admits a
poly(n) time separation oracle. By Theorem 2.1, both LPs can be solved in poly(n) time. We note that the
(efficiently) computed optimal solution of the LP in Figure (2) will have a support of poly(n) size. In fact,
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Theorem (2.3) guarantees that there exists a defender maximin strategy that mixes over at most n + 1 pure
strategies, and it can be computed efficiently.
Reducing DBR to Minimax Equilibrium
Recall that all the feasible marginal coverage probabilities form the polytope P , and the vertices of P form
the set E of defender pure strategies. We start with a simple fact of linear programing, which states that any
linear program achieves optimality at some vertex of its feasible region (if non-empty).
Fact 4.2. maxe∈E [w · e] = maxx∈P [w · x], where P is the convex hull of E .
By Fact 4.2, solving the DBR problem is equivalent to solving the linear program maxx∈P [w · x].
The main technical step of our proof is to reduce the membership checking problem for polytope P to the
computation of minimax equilibrium. Therefore, computing the minimax equilibrium will allow us to find a
poly(n) time membership oracle for P . By the polynomial-time equivalence between membership checking
and optimization (Theorem 2.2), we can conclude that the DBR problem can also be solved in poly(n)
time. Unfortunately, it turns out that membership checking for polytope P cannot be easily reduced to the
computation of minimax equilibrium because some x ∈ P are entry-wise dominated by (i.e., entry-wise
less than) other x′ ∈ P , so that x can never be a defender equilibrium strategy. To overcome this barrier,
we first relax the polytope P and work on a broader set P̂ of marginal probabilities. We then make use
of the non-negativity of weights in the DBR problem to transfer linear optimization over P̂ back to linear
optimization over P .
We first introduce some notations. We call ê ∈ {0, 1}n a sub pure strategy (of e) if there exists an e ∈ E
such that êi ≤ ei for all i ∈ [n]. Equivalently, the covered targets of a sub pure strategy ê is a subset of
the covered targets of some real pure strategy e. For example, the all zero vector 0 is always a sub pure
strategy; any pure strategy e ∈ E is also a sub pure strategy (of itself). Notice that sub pure strategies are
not necessarily feasible. For example, in the air marshal scheduling problem, a feasible schedule for an air
marshal has to be a round trip, not a one-way flight. We now define the relaxed set of pure strategies
Ê = { all e ∈ E and all their sub pure strategies }
to be the set of E augmented with all sub pure strategies. The following lemma shows that, when considering
the DBR problem, relaxing E to Ê is without loss.
Lemma 4.3. maxe∈E [e ·w] = maxê∈Ê [ê ·w] for any w ∈ Rn+.
Proof. Since E ⊆ Ê , we have maxe∈E [e · w] ≤ maxê∈Ê [ê · w]. To prove another direction, let ê∗ =
arg max
ê∈Ê [ê · w]. By definition, there exists e∗ ∈ E such that ê∗ is a sub pure strategy of e∗. Since
w ∈ Rn+ is non-negative, we must have e∗ ·w ≥ ê∗ ·w. Therefore,
max
e∈E
[e ·w] ≥ e∗ ·w ≥ ê∗ ·w = max
ê∈Ê
[ê ·w],
which concludes the proof.
We now define the relaxed polytope of marginal probabilities as follows.
P̂ = {x : x =
∑
ê∈Ê
pê · ê, ∀p ∈ ∆|Ê|}.
We next show that the DBR problem over E can be reduced to linear optimization (or equivalently, member-
ship checking, due to Theorem 2.2) of this relaxed polytope P̂ . It is easy to show that the optimal objective
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value of the DBR problem is equal to max
x∈P̂ [x · w]. However, the problem is that the optimal (vertex)
solution to max
x∈P̂ [x · w], i.e., some ê∗ ∈ Ê , is a sub pure strategy, which may not be a feasible real
pure strategy (since w may have zero-valued entries), but an algorithm for the DBR problem must return
a feasible optimal solution. Nevertheless, this can be handled by properly regularizing the linear program
max
x∈P̂ [x ·w] to make sure that its optimal vertex solution is always feasible for the DBR problem over E .
Lemma 4.4. The DBR problem over E reduces to membership checking for polytope P̂ in poly(n) time.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 and Fact 4.2, we have maxe∈E [e ·w] = maxê∈Ê [ê ·w] = maxx∈P̂ [x ·w]. With the
access to an efficient membership oracle for P̂ , we can solve the optimization problem max
x∈P̂ [x ·w] and
compute a vertex optimal solution, i.e., some ê∗ ∈ Ê , in poly(n) time by Theorem 2.2 (note that P̂ has a
trivial feasible point 0). If ê∗ is also in E , then we know that ê∗ is also optimal for the DBR problem with
weight w. However, ê∗ may not be in E due to possible zero-valued entries in w. We now show how to
properly regularize the linear program max
x∈P̂ [x ·w] to guarantee that the returned optimal vertex solution
is always a feasible pure strategy, and meanwhile, is still optimal for the objective x ·w.
Let polynomial q(n) be the bit complexity of w, and let  = 2−q(n)/2n which is still of polynomial bit
length. Now consider the regularized optimization problem max
x∈P̂ [x · w + (x · 1)]. First observe that
any vertex optimal solution to the regularized optimization problem will be a real pure strategy. Otherwise,
substituting a sub pure strategy by the corresponding real pure strategy will not decrease the first term x ·w
but will strictly increase the second term (1 · x), thus strictly increases the whole objective value. We now
claim that if a pure strategy e∗ is optimal for the regularized linear objective x · w + (x · 1) over P̂ , it
is also optimal for the DBR problem over E with weight w. Suppose toward contradiction that e∗ ∈ E is
optimal for the regularized optimization problem but is not optimal for the DBR problem. Then there exists
a feasible pure strategy e′ such that e′ · w > e∗ · w. In fact, since e∗, e′ are 0-1 vectors and w has bit
complexity q(n), we have e′ ·w − e∗ ·w ≥ 2−q(n). Therefore,
e∗ ·w + (1 · e∗) ≤ e′ ·w − 2−q(n) + n
= e′ ·w − 2−q(n)/2
< e′ ·w + (1 · e′),
which contradicts the fact that e∗ is optimal for the regularized optimization problem. Therefore, e∗ must be
optimal for the DBR problem. Moreover, the regularized optimization problem can be solved in polynomial
time with access to a poly(n) time membership oracle for P̂ . This proves the lemma.
We are now ready to complete the reduction by reducing membership checking for polytope P̂ to solving
zero-sum security games over E . Before that, we first show the following down-monotone property of the
relaxed polytope P̂ , which turns out to be crucial for the reduction.
Lemma 4.5. Polytope P̂ is down-monotone in Rn+. That is, for any x ∈ P̂ and 0 ≤ x′ ≤ x (entry-wise),
we have x′ ∈ P̂ .
Proof. Let x ∈ P̂ and x′ satisfy x′i ≤ xi for all i ∈ [n]. We show that x′ ∈ P̂ . In particular, starting from a
convex decomposition for x, we will construct a convex decomposition for x′ over elements in Ê.
Since x ∈ P̂ , there exists p ∈ ∆|Ê|, such that
x =
∑
ê∈Ê
pê · ê. (4)
For all the ê satisfying ê1 = 1, let ê′ ∈ Ê be the sub pure strategy, which is the same as ê except that ê′1 = 0.
Then we take the following operations: change the coefficient of ê in Equation (4) to pê · x
′
1
x1
and change the
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coefficient of ê′ in Equation (4) to pê′ + pê · (1− x
′
1
x1
). It is easy to check that these new coefficients still sum
up to 1 and are non-negative. Therefore, Equation (4) with the new coefficients is still a convex combination
over elements in Ê, which gives us a new vector x′′ ∈ Ê. Moreover, x′′ satisfies x′′1 = x′1 and x′′i = xi for
all i ≥ 2. Continuing these operations at all the other entries of x′′, we will reach a convex decomposition
of x′. Therefore, x′ ∈ Ê.
Lemma 4.6. Membership checking for polytope P̂ reduces in poly(n) time to computing the game value of
zero-sum security games over E .
Proof. Given any x ∈ Rn, we show how to check whether x ∈ P̂ by solving properly constructed zero-sum
security games. We assume x lies in Rn+ since otherwise x 6∈ P̂ . Given any x ∈ Rn+, we construct the
following security game instance:
• For any i ∈ [n] such that xi = 0, let ci = 1 and ri = 2. Therefore, xiri + (1− xi)ci = 1.
• For any i ∈ [n] such that xi > 0, let ci = 0 and ri = 1xi . Therefore, xiri + (1− xi)ci = 1.
Note that in both cases, the condition ri > ci is satisfied. We claim that the defender’s optimal utility,
i.e., the game value, in the above zero-sum security game is at least 1 if and only if x ∈ P̂ .
⇒ direction: Let (p∗,x∗, u∗) be the optimal solution to the LP in Figure 2. If the defender’s optimal
utility is at least 1, i.e., u∗ ≥ 1. We have
x∗i ri + (1− x∗i )ci ≥ u∗ ≥ 1 = xiri + (1− xi)ci, ∀i ∈ [n].
Since ri > ci, this induces x∗i ≥ xi for any i. Notice that the optimal (feasible) marginal probability x∗ is
in P by definition and P ⊆ P̂ , therefore x∗ ∈ P̂ . However, xi ≤ x∗i for any i and P̂ is down monotone, so
x ∈ P̂ , as desired.
⇐ direction: Let x ∈ P̂ . So there exists p ∈ ∆|Ê| such that
x =
∑
ê∈Ê
pê · ê. (5)
Notice that each ê is a sub pure strategy of some real pure strategy e(ê) ∈ E . By substituting the ê in
Equation (5) by e(ê), we have
x =
∑
ê∈Ê
pê · ê ≤
∑
ê∈Ê
pê · e(ê).
Since x′ =
∑
ê∈Ê pê · e(ê) is a convex combination of pure strategies in E , we have x′ ∈ P . Moreover,
by playing the mixed strategy with marginal probability x′, the defender’s expected utility is at least 1 since
x′i ≥ xi for any i ∈ [n]. As a result, the optimal defender utility in this zero-sum game is at least 1,
completing the proof.
Lemma 4.4 and 4.6 forms a reduction from the DBR problem to the mimimax equilibrium. This together
with the reduction from the minimax equilibrum to the DBR problem conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.1 When Gaming is Easier than Best Response
Security games are special bilinear games. Theorem 4.1 shows that the particular problem of computing
the minimax equilibrium for zero-sum security games is as hard as the general DBR problem. A natural
question is whether there are instances such that the hardness of gaming and best response are strictly
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separated. Notice, however, that the best response problem is essentially more general, thus no easier, than
solving the game. Therefore, the question really is, whether there are instances where gaming is easier than
best response. The following proposition answers this in the affirmative for security games. Notice that this
proposition does not contradict Theorem 4.1, since the constructed security game instances here have further
restricted payoffs, which make solving the game easy but still maintain the hardness of the best response.
Proposition 4.7. There exist zero-sum security games such that the minimax equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time but the DBR problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Consider a security game played on a complete graph Kn. Each edge is a target. The defender has
k(< n) security resources and each resource can patrol a vertex, by which the n − 1 adjacent edges of this
vertex are covered. An edge is covered if at least one of its end vertexes is patrolled. Given that the attacker
attacks any edge e, the defender gets utility 1 if it is protected and utility 0 otherwise. The attacker seeks
to minimize the defender’s utility. The DBR problem for this security game is, given weight we ≥ 0 for
any edge e ∈ Kn, finding k vertexes that maximize the total edge weight they cover. This is NP-hard by a
trivial reduction from vertex cover. However, by symmetry, it is not hard to check that uniformly randomly
sampling k vertexes from Kn to patrol is a minimax equilibrium.
5 General-sum Security Games
In this section, we consider general-sum security games. Recall that such a game G is given by a tuple
(r, c, ρ, ζ, E) where ri [ci] is the defender’s reward [cost] and ρi [ζi] is the attacker’s reward [cost], if target
i is attacked. We consider the computation of the two mostly adopted equilibrium concepts in the security
game literature, namely, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) and Nash equilibrium (NE). For each
equilibrium concept, we prove analogous equivalence theorem as the zero-sum case.
Theorem 5.1. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the strong Stackelberg equilibrium for security
games over E , if and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to solve the DBR problem over E .
Proof. The “only if” direction follows from Theorem 4.1, the fact that the minimax equilibrium is payoff-
equivalent to the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) in zero-sum games, and that zero-sum games are
special cases of general-sum games. We only prove the “if” direction. Recalling the definition of SSE in
Section 2.1, without loss of generality, we can assume the attacker always plays a pure strategy since he
moves after the defender. As observed in [7], to compute the defender’s optimal mixed strategy, we can
enumerate all the possibilities of the attacker’s best response choices. In particular, constrained on that the
attacker’s best response is target k, the defender’s optimal strategy can be computed by the following linear
program (denoted as LPk):
maximize xkrk + (1− xk)ck
subject to (1− xk)ρk + xkζk ≥ (1− xi)ρi + xiζi, for i 6= k.∑
e∈E pe · e = x∑
e∈E pe = 1
pe ≥ 0, for e ∈ E .
where the first set of constrains is to guarantee that the attacker is indeed incentivized to attack target k.
It is not hard to check that the dual program of LPk admits a poly(n) time separation oracle if the DBR
problem can be solved in poly(n) time. The SSE can be computed by solving LP1, ..., LPn and then picking
the optimal defender mixed strategy (and corresponding attacker best response) of the LP with the largest
objective value.
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We now turn to the computation of Nash equilibria. As widely known in the literature of algorithmic
game theory, computing one Nash equilibrium for two-player normal-form games is PPAD-hard [6, 9], and is
only harder for general bilinear games [14]. Interestingly, it turns out that computing one Nash equilibrium
in security games is relatively easy. This is due to the following characterization of Nash equilibria in
security games by [20].
Lemma 5.2. [20] Consider a security game G(r, c, ρ, ζ, E). Let G(−ζ,−ρ, ρ, ζ, E) be the corresponding
zero-sum security game by re-setting the defender’s utilities. Then (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of G if and
only if (x, f(y)) is a minimax equilibrium of the zero-sum game G, where the one-to-one transform function
f : Rn → Rn is defined as follows:
fi(y) =
1
λ
ri − ci
ρi − ζi yi, ∀i ∈ [n], where λ =
n∑
i=1
ri − ci
ρi − ζi yi is the normalization factor. (6)
Moreover, Nash equilibria of G are interchangeable. That is, if (x,y) and (x′,y′) are both Nash equilibria,
so are (x,y′) and (x′,y). The attacker derives the same utility in any Nash equilibrium of G.
Notice that the transform function defined in Equation (6) is non-linear due to the normalization factor. We
sketch the intuition of Lemma 5.2 here, while refer the reader to [20] for a formal proof. Note that the map-
ping f only re-weights those non-zero yi’s whose indexes correspond to attacker best responses, so f(y) is
also a best response to x in G, thus also in G, since the defender strategy and attacker payoff structure in
both games are the same. On the other hand, x is a best response to y in G. From G to G, the defender’s
utility on each target is changed. The idea here is to properly rescale the attacker’s attacking probability
to compensate for the defender’s utility change so that the defender’s best response does not change. The
transform function f exactly does this. The interchangeability follows from the interchangeability of min-
imax equilibria of G. It is easy to see that the attacker’s utility in any NE equals his (unique) utility in the
zero-sum game G.
As a corollary of Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 4.1, there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute one
Nash equilibrium for security games if and only if there is a polynomial time DBR oracle. However, it
is widely known that the Nash equilibrium is not unique, so there are issues of equilibrium selection. In
many security settings (e.g., [24, 25]), the NE that maximizes or minimizes the defender’s utility is a natural
choice for analyzing the game. Though Lemma 5.2 shows that the attacker will derive the same utility in
any NE, the defender’s utilities are generally different in different NEs (examples are given in [20]).
As widely known, maximizing a player’s utility over Nash equilibria is NP-hard even in two-player
normal-form games [8, 15]. It will be appealing if the optimal NE can be efficiently computed in the
security game, which is widely recognized as a successful application of game theory. Our next result shows
that this is indeed the case! We prove that though the defender’s equilibrium utility is generally a convex
function of the attacker’s mixed strategy, it becomes linear when restricted to the domain of the attacker
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, maximizing or minimizing the defender’s Nash equilibrium utility can
both be efficiently handled.
Theorem 5.3. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the best and worst (for the defender) Nash
equilibrium for security games over E , if and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to solve the DBR
problem over E . Here, by “best/worst” we mean the NE that maximizes/minimizes the defender’s utility.
Proof. The “only if” direction follows from Theorem 4.1, the fact that all Nash equilibria are payoff equiv-
alent to the minimax equilibrium in zero-sum games, and that zero-sum games are special cases of general-
sum games. For the “if” direction, we only prove this for the case of computing the best Nash equilibrium
since computing the worst Nash equilibrium is similar.
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The defender’s equilibrium utility is a function of the attacker’s strategy, which we denote as UNE(y).
We first derive the function form of UNE(y), as follows:
UNE(y) = max
e∈E
Ud(e,y)
= max
e∈E
[ n∑
i=1
eiyi(ri − ci)
]
+
n∑
i=1
yici.
UNE(y) is a convex function since maxe∈E [
∑n
i=1 eiyi(ri−ci)] is convex. To compute the best equilibrium,
we need to maximize this convex function over feasible ywhich is generally difficult to handle. Interestingly,
we show that the term maxe∈E
[∑n
i=1 eiyi(ri − ci)
]
becomes linear in y when y is restricted to be an
attacker equilibrium strategy. Let (x,y) be an NE of G. Recall from Lemma 5.2 that (x, f(y)) is the
minimax equilibrium of the zero-sum game G(−ζ,−ρ, ρ, ζ, E). Therefore,
V al(G) = Ud(x, f(y))
=
n∑
i=1
fi(y)xi
(
ρi − ζi
)− n∑
i=1
fi(y)ρi
= max
e∈E
[ n∑
i=1
fi(y)ei
(
ρi − ζi
)]− n∑
i=1
fi(y)ρi (7)
is the game value of G. Recalling the transform fi(y) = 1λ ri−ciρi−ζi yi and utilizing Equation (7), we have
max
e∈E
[ n∑
i=1
eiyi(ri − ci)
]
= max
e∈E
[ n∑
i=1
eiλfi(y)(ρi − ζi)
]
By definition of fi(y)
= λ ·max
e∈E
[ n∑
i=1
eifi(y)(ρi − ζi)
]
= λ ·
[
V al(G) +
n∑
i=1
fi(y)ρi
]
By Equation (7)
= λ · V al(G) +
n∑
i=1
ri − ci
ρi − ζi yiρi By definition of fi(y)
Crucially, V al(G) is a constant and does not depend on y. Since λ =
∑n
i=1
ri−ci
ρi−ζi yi is linear in y, so is
maxe∈E
[∑n
i=1 eiyi(ri − ci)
]
. Therefor, UNE(y) is linear in y. We note again that this is true only when
y is restricted to be an attacker NE strategy since the above derivation is not valid otherwise. Fortunately,
we only need to optimize over Nash equilibria. Notice that V al(G) can be computed in poly(n) time if
the DBR admits a poly(n) time algorithm (by Theorem 4.1). As a result, UNE(y) is a linear function of
y which can be evaluated efficiently. Therefore, computing the best Nash equilibrium reduces to a linear
optimization over the set of all the attacker’s Nash equilibrium strategies, denoted as YNE . To complete the
proof, we now show that YNE is a polytope, and admits a poly(n) time separation oracle. Therefore, by
Theorem 2.1, we conclude that the best (for the defender) Nash equilibrium can be computed in poly(n)
time.
Lemma 5.4. The set of the attacker’s Nash equilibrium strategies YNE is a polytope, and admits a poly(n)
time separation oracle if the DBR problem over E can be solved in poly(n) time.
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Proof of Lemma 5.4. First, compute an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (x˜, y˜) of G. By Lemma 5.2 and Theorem
4.1, this can be done in poly(n) time. We claim that the set of attacker’s Nash equilibrium strategies YNE
is characterized precisely by the following three sets of linear constraints on y ∈ Rn:
n∑
i=1
yi
(
ρi · [1− x˜i] + ζi · x˜i
) ≥ ρk · [1− x˜k] + ζk · x˜k, ∀k ∈ [n]. (8)
n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri · x˜i + ci · [1− x˜i]
) ≥ n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri · ei + ci · [1− ei]
)
, ∀e ∈ E . (9)
n∑
i=1
yi = 1 and yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n]. (10)
Inequality (8) restricts y to be an attacker best response to the defender equilibrium strategy x˜; Inequality
(9) means that x˜ should be a defender best response to the attacker mixed strategy y.
We first show that these constraints are necessary. By Lemma 5.2, Nash equilibria in security games are
interchangeable. Therefore if y is an attacker equilibrium strategy, (x˜,y) is a Nash equilibrium. Thus y and
x˜ are best responses to each other, as described by Inequality (8) and (9). Since y is a mixed strategy, thus
Constraint (10) holds.
To show that these constraints are also sufficient, let y be any vector that satisfies these constraints.
Constraint (10) restricts y to be a valid mixed strategy; Inequality (8) and (9) induce that (x˜,y) is a Nash
equilibrium. To sum up, Constraints (8) ∼ (10) precisely characterize the set YNE .
We now show that YNE admits a poly(n) time separation oracle. Notice that Constraints (8) and (10)
can be explicitly checked in poly(n) time. Constraint (9) can be simplified as follows:
n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri · x˜i + ci · [1− x˜i]
) ≥ n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri · ei + ci · [1− ei]
)
, ∀e ∈ E .
⇔
n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri − ci
) · x˜i ≥ n∑
i=1
yi
(
ri − ci
) · ei, ∀e ∈ E .
The inequality can be checked by feeding wi = yi
(
ri − ci
)
into the DBR problem over E and examining
whether the optimal objective value is at most
∑n
i=1 yi
(
ri− ci
) · x˜i, and if not, returning the optimal e from
the DBR problem as a certificate of the violated constraint. Therefore, a poly(n) time DBR oracle yields a
poly(n) time separation oracle for YNE . This completes our proof of Lemma 5.2, as well as the proof of
the theorem.
The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 5.3. It follows from the fact proved in Theorem 5.3 that
the defender’s equilibrium utility is a linear function over the set YNE of attacker equilibrium strategies and
YNE is a polytope. Therefore, we can convert the computation of an NE with particular defender equilibrium
utility to feasibility checking of a linear system.
Corollary 5.5. Let G be any security game, Umax [Umin] be the best [worst] defender utility among all
Nash equilibria. Then for any U ∈ [Umin, Umax], there exists an NE of G with defender utility U . Moreover,
such an NE can be computed in polynomial time if the DBR problem over E can be solved in polynomial
time.
6 Consequences of the Equivalence Theorems
In this section we discuss some implications of these equivalence theorems. The following corollary of
Theorem 4.1, 5.1 and 5.3 shows that the complexity of a security game is determined by the set system E .
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Corollary 6.1. For any set system E , the following problems reduce to each other in polynomial time:
(1) Combinatorial optimization over E for non-negative linear objectives;
(2) Solving zero-sum security games over E;
(3) Computing the strong Stackelberg equilibrium for security games over E;
(4) Computing the best or worst (for the defender) Nash equilibrium for security games over E .
Corollary 6.1 provides a more convenient way to understand the computational complexity of security
games, since the complexity of the combinatorial optimization problem over E is much easier to study and
analyze. In fact, Corollary 6.1 simultaneously implies the computational complexity for solving various
types of security games. For example, when E is any matroid set system or when the optimization over
E has a min-cost max flow formulation, the equilibrium of the security game can be computed efficiently.
On the other hand, when the optimization over E is a packing problem, a Knapsack problem or a coverage
problem (even vertex coverage), the equilibrium computation for these security games is NP-hard in general.
Finally, using the combinatorial characterization of security games, we can easily recover and strengthen
some known complexity results in the literature of security games, as well as resolve some open problems
from previous work. For example, Xu et al. [36] considered the computation of the minimax equilibrium
in zero-sum spatio-temporal security games. They proved that the DBR problem there is NP-hard, but the
computation of the minimax equilibrium is left open. Theorem 4.1 resolves this open question. Brown et
al. [4] studied the airport passenger screening game (see Section 3.3, the example of packing problems),
and proved the NP-hardness to solve the game. This also follows from Corollary 6.1 and the fact that the
independent set problem is NP-hard. Gan et al. [13] considered security games on graphs where targets are
vertices. The defender chooses a subset of vertices to patrol, by which the patrolled vertices as well as their
adjacent vertices are covered. The DBR problem is to, given a non-negative weight for each vertex, compute
a subset of vertices so that the total weight of the covered vertices is maximized. This is the optimization
variant of the dominating set problem, a well-known NP-hard problem. Therefore, not only computing the
SSE is NP-hard (as shown by Gan et al.), our results strengthen the hardness to computing the minimax
equilibrium. Korzhyk et al. [18] considered security games in which the DBR problem is the coverage
problem as discussed in Section 3.3. They showed polynomial solvability of security games when each
(homogeneous) resource can protect a subset of at most 2 targets (e.g., a pair of round-trip flights). This also
follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that weighted 2-cover is polynomial time solvable. The NP-hardness
for the case with sets of at most 3 targets follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that 3-cover is NP-hard.
Finally, Letchford and Conitzer [22] proved complexity results under various conditions for security games
played on graphs, where vertices are targets and each security resource can patrol a set of vertices on a
path of the graph. Some of their results can be recovered using our results as well. For example, the paper
considered two conditions, under any of which the minimax equilibrium of the game can be computed in
polynomial time. It is easy to check that the DBR problems under these two conditions can be solved
respectively by a greedy algorithm (the case of Theorem 1 in [22]) and a dynamic program (the case of
Theorem 2 in [22]), thus the polynomial solvability also follows from our results. We omit further details
here.
7 Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, we systematically studied the computational complexity of equilibrium computation in security
games. Our main result is the polynomial time equivalence between computing the three mostly adopted
equilibrium concepts in security games, namely, the minimax equilibrium, strong Stackelberg equilibrium,
best/worst Nash equilibrium, and computing the defender’s best response. We believe that our results form
a theoretical basis for further algorithm design and complexity analysis in security games.
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Future research can take a number of directions. First, given that exactly solving the DBR problem is
NP-hard in many cases, it is interesting to examine the approximate version of all our equivalence theorems.
That is, how an approximate defender best response oracle relates to the approximate computation of an
equilibrium. We note that using the no-regret learning framework, one can convert an FPTAS for the DBR
problem to an algorithm for computing an -minimax equilibrium (see [17]), but the reverse direction and
other generalizations are open. Our results on computing the best/worst Nash equilibrium are surprising.
Since the security game is a special class of bilinear games, we wonder whether similar results hold in other
special (and interpretable) class of bilinear games. Finally, there are several ways to generalize our model.
For example, the players’ utility functions may not be linear, but can still by compactly represented and
computed. One particular example is the network interdiction game played on a graph [31, 35], in which
the defender chooses edges to defend and the attacker chooses a path to attack. The task of the defender
is to interdict the attacker at a certain edge. This is not captured by our (bilinear) framework. Another
generalization is to allow the attacker to attack multiple targets [19]. We wonder how the computational
complexity of the proposed four problems relates to each other in these generalized settings.
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